Creation and Operation of Main Railways in Bukovina
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**Abstract**
This study aims to review the socio-political and economic preconditions of creation and beginning of operation of main railways in Bukovina. The analysis of scientific and memoir literature, recollections, review of archival sources allowed establishing the fact that the problem of formation and beginning of operation of the network of railways in Bukovina of the Austro-Hungarian period was not a subject of systematic and integral investigation. It was shown that the idea of building railways in Bukovina was also in the political and socio-economic interests of Austria in the south-eastern region of Europe because by laying railways, the imperial government provided itself with a favourable strategic position in the region. Based on the results of the study, it was established that with the construction of the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași railway, railway communications came to first place in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in terms of material, technical, defense and economic potential.

**Keywords:** railways of Bukovina, Austro-Hungarian Empire, transport network, A. Ficker, G. Biedermann.

**Introduction**
Already 150 years have passed since the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași railway connected Iași, the former capital of the Principality of Moldavia, with Chernivtsi, the capital of the Duchy of Bukovina, and Lviv, the capital of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, in 1870. The scientific basis for studying the issues of condition and development of the mentioned railways in Bukovina was laid by Austrian historians of the second half of the 19th century, most of whom lived in the region of Bukovina. One of the first significant works in the economic history of Bukovina (including transport) was a relatively small but rich in statistical data publication of Professor A. Ficker “One Hundred Years (1775-1875)”, published in Vienna in 1875 on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Bukovina to Austria1. A. Ficker was one of the first to analyze the evolution of landowners’ estates from feudal dominions to entrepreneurial farms. He noted the measures aimed at intensification of farming agriculture and stock-raising, including the use of machinery, expanding the cultivation of industrial crops, changes in the structure of farming lands and cultivation areas in compliance

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with the new market requirements, the level of profitability of estates, strengthening the commercialization of stock-raising and based on all these issues he showed the role of rail transport in the domestic economy of Bukovina and, in particular, for the agricultural sector of the economy.

On the occasion of the same anniversary, the Bukovinian historian of Austrian origin G.I. Biedermann published a historical essay “Bukovina under Austrian rule: 1775-1875” (1876)². In his essay, among other issues, he paid considerable attention to the system of land-tenure in Bukovina, distribution of land between peasants, landowners and the Orthodox Religious Fund of Bukovina, land-utilization system, national composition of landowners, the role of German colonists, number of peasant farms and network of local railways in Bukovina. As the Chernivtsi historian I.V. Zhaloba notes in his works, “… for Austrian historiography it is typical to consider the historical past of Bukovina through the prism of the cultural role of Austria. And although in Austrian historiography there are no special works on the history of railroads in Bukovina, in overall studies, where this subject is touched, the application of such an approach is observed. For this purpose, the method of contrasting the past with the present is used…”³. In the mentioned work of G. I. Biedermann, it is also stated that even a superficial glance at the state of the roads shows “a sharp contrast between the past and the present in terms of improving their construction”⁴.

The tendency when objective reasons are erased and the subjective factor comes to the fore is observed also in the works of other Austrian historians, such as R. F. Kaindl, J. Polek, K. Kozak, E. Fischer, et al. In addition, studying the history of railroads construction, Austrian scientists did not touch on the negative aspects of this process, in particular, such as growing exploitation of hired workers, impoverishment of craftsmen, etc. In general, the tendency to whitewash the activities of the Austro-Hungarian government in the field of construction of waterways and land roads in Bukovina was a typical feature in the literature of that time.

A. Ficker and G. Biederman practically initiated the study of socio-economic, including transport aspects in Bukovina in the second half of the 19th

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³ Ihor Zhaloba. “Розвиток Залізничної Мережі на Буковині у Другій Половині ХІХ – На Початку ХХ ст.”, *50 років Вовиднання Північної Буковини і Хотинського повіту Бессарабії з Радянською Україною у складі СРСР: Тези доповідей та поздовжній обласній історико-краєзнавчої наукової конференції*, Чернівці, травень 11-12, 1990, 7 [in Ukrainian].
century\textsuperscript{5}. Later, several works appeared\textsuperscript{6}, in which the authors, along with other aspects, analyzed the state of development of the national transport system\textsuperscript{7} (including railway transport) of Bukovina\textsuperscript{8}.

The most prolific (and objective) German historian of Bukovina of the Austro-Hungarian period was R.F. Kaindl\textsuperscript{9}. He devoted a lot of attention in his works to the roads of Bukovina\textsuperscript{10}, their infrastructure, construction and operation. In particular, the third volume of his most remarkable work “History of Bukovina”\textsuperscript{11}, goes about the preservation of significant feudal remnants in the region after 1848, the redemption of the land, condition of roads in Bukovina, about the network of railways and it is emphasized that the latter are used at a relatively low level. To some extent, he covered the same issues in his works “Hutsuls”\textsuperscript{12}, “Zhuchka”\textsuperscript{13}, and “Bukovina in 1848 and 1849”\textsuperscript{14}. In his studies we find information about the old trade routes that crossed the territory of the region in pre-Austrian times; on the construction of paved roads in Bukovina; on the use of rivers of the region for timber floating; time of commissioning of railways, their length, etc.

A significant professional study of the problems of railway transport in Bukovina in the Austro-Hungarian period was the work of E.A. Ziffer, President of the “Joint Stock Company of Local Railways of Bukovina”, “Local Railways in Galicia and Bukovina”\textsuperscript{15}. The author, a specialist in the railway industry (but not a historian), having rich factual material at his disposal, highlighted the current state of the Bukovina railways in several aspects: employment of the population in the construction of local railways, some progressive changes in railway infrastructure, improvement of car and track facilities, organization of railway business, the activity of professional and cooperative organizations, increase in the level of provision with railway equipment, emphasized a positive role of railway transport in the development of the national economy of Bukovina. At the

\textsuperscript{5} Johann Polek. \textit{Weinhandel und Weinbaum in der Bukowina} (Czernowitz: Pardini, 1904): 16
\textsuperscript{6} Eugen Worobkewicz. \textit{Die geographisch – Statistischen Verhältnisse der Bukowina} (Lemberg, 1893), 116
\textsuperscript{7} Carl Romstorfer and Hubert Wiglitzky, \textit{Vergleichende Graphische Statistik in ihrer Anwendung auf der Herzogtum Bukowina} (Wien, 1887), 503.
\textsuperscript{8} Emil Baier. \textit{Fünfzig Jahre Viehzucht in der Bukowina} (Czernowitz, 1900): 22.
\textsuperscript{9} Raimund Kaindl. \textit{Die Erwerbung der Bukowina durch Osterreich} (Czernowitz, 1894): 10.
\textsuperscript{10} Raimund Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte von Czernowitz} (Czernowitz, 1908): 224
\textsuperscript{11} Raimund Kaindl, \textit{Geschichte der Bukowina. Dritte Abschnitt} (Czernowitz, 1898): 80.
\textsuperscript{12} Raimund Kaindl, \textit{Die Huzulen} (Wien, 1894), 129.
\textsuperscript{13} Raimund Kaindl, \textit{Zuczka} (Czernowitz, 1900), 40.
\textsuperscript{14} Raimund Kaindl, \textit{Die Bukowina der Jahren 1848 und 1849} (Wien, 1900): 68.
\textsuperscript{15} Emanuel Ziffer, \textit{Die Lokalbahnen in Galizien und der Bukowina} (Wien, 1891): 190.
same time, the paper briefly describes the crisis that developed in the early 80s of the 19th century as a result of the shortage of capital for the construction of local railways in Bukovina.

For all the value of this work, we should note that not all phenomena were shown by him in dynamics for a certain period. Some data are given only for a particular year, mostly at the end of the 19th century. In addition, the work does not cover the period after 1890. This was the first relatively large 190 pages monograph.

Particular attention to the situation in Bukovina during that period and especially to the condition of Bukovinan railways was also paid by historians of tsarist Russia. However, their studies with a few exceptions were mostly based on imperialist positions to substantiate the rights of the Russian Empire to the future conquest of Bukovina and Galicia. I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky (1915); T. Florinsky (1900) et al. Pre-revolutionary works on the problems of private railway transport in Russia\textsuperscript{16} were mostly not of research,\textsuperscript{17} but journalistic nature\textsuperscript{18}. But since their authors, as a rule, were well aware of the actual state of affairs, their works have an undoubted interest.

A significant scientific achievement of the 1990s – early 21st century in the study of ways of communication of Bukovina in the late 18th – early 20th century (including railway transport) were several articles and a thesis of I. V. Zhaloba\textsuperscript{19}. His works deeply analyze the mechanism of development of ways of

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\item \textsuperscript{16} Sergei Kul’zhinskij. \textit{K Voprosu o Chastnyh Zheleznyh Dorogah v Rossii} (Sankt-Peterburg, 1909), 128 [in Russian].
\item \textsuperscript{17} Konstantin Zagorskij. \textit{Chastnoe Zheleznodorozhnoe Stroitel’stvo i Garantiya Zheleznodorozhnyh Akcij} (Sankt-Peterburg, 1912), 54 [in Russian].
\item \textsuperscript{18} Aleksandr Bublikov. \textit{Chastnoe Zheleznodorozhnoe Stroitel’stvo Poslednih Let} (Sankt-Peterburg, 1914), 55 [in Russian].
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communication in Bukovina (dirt roads, waterways, railways). In the general analysis of the ways of communication in the region, a significant place is given to railway transport. The author paid special attention to the discussion of the draft law on assistance to the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway in the Austrian parliament and highlighted its socio-political reaction (autumn 1863) in the railway policy of the Austrian government in Galicia during the years of the Crimean (Eastern) War (1853-1856), choice of the direction of the railway in the northeast of the Habsburg Monarchy and Bukovina in the 1850s – the early 1860s Brody or Chernivtsi, condition of the land roads in Bukovina of the late 19th – early 20th century, construction of the first local railways in Bukovina in the 1780s and their operational subordination, and finally, the issue of the railway communication Chernivtsi-Odesa in terms of geopolitical interests of Austria and Russia (1860s). In his works I. V. Zhaloba reflected also the issues of the development of railways of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the beginning.


of construction to 1854, the history of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway to Suceava and Iași, the construction of Chernivtsi railway station and finally, he told a wonderful story about the life and work of a civil engineer E. A. Ziiffer, President of the Joint Stock Company “Bukovinian Local Railways”.

Modern historians from different countries of the world also do not ignore different aspects of the history of the formation of the railways in Bukovina.

Analysis of scientific and memoir literature, recollections, review of archival sources allows stating the fact that the problem related to the study of socio-political and economic preconditions of formation and operation of the railway network in Bukovina of the Austro-Hungarian period was not the subject of the systematic and comprehensive study. In general, the beginning of operation of the railway transport in Bukovina in the literature is covered sporadically. Despite the diversity of the mentioned works, which to a greater or lesser extent covered this problem, it should be noted that there are still no works that would comprehensively study all aspects of socio-political and economic preconditions and the history of the formation and operation of the Bukovina main railways in the Austro-Hungarian period.

This study aims to review the socio-political and economic preconditions of creation and beginning of operation of main railways in Bukovina.


Socio-economic and political preconditions for the construction of the first railway mainline in Bukovina - Lviv - Chernivtsi - Iaşi and its international importance

The rapid pace of the transport revolution in advanced countries, which demonstrated a gigantic economic, political and military-strategic importance of railways to the whole world\(^\text{32}\), forced the government of the Habsburg Monarchy to deal very thoroughly with the issue of railways construction. Back in the late 1820s, leading Austrian railway engineers were sent on business trips abroad to study the railway business in England and Western Europe. Based on an in-depth study of the world experience in railway construction, they wrote multi-volume theoretical works in the form of “reports”, which became a remarkable event in the history of the world railway literature. In the works, they provided a comprehensive analysis of the state of railway transport and its role in the economic life of the leading capitalist countries, made substantiated conclusions about the application of the advanced world experience in the development of transport\(^\text{33}\). In these works the detailed and theoretically correct studies were carried out to establish the constant width of the rail track, develop methods for manufacturing railway rails, construction of the roadbed, lay-out of ditch cuts, road bodies, pipelines, junctions, switch point communication, swinging circles, etc. Here for the first time the theoretical definition of “steam locomotive” was given\(^\text{34}\). Thanks to


\(^{34}\) Viktor Virginskij, *Voznikovenie Zheleznyh Dorog v Rossii do Nachala 40-h Godov XIX Veka* (Moskva, 1949), 256 [in Russian].
the great theoretical work of Austrian engineers in the first half of the 19th century in Austria, the fundamentals of the national railway scientific and technical school were laid. That is why starting from the late 1820s, the construction of the railway network in the Austrian Empire gradually expanded and ever more extended to the outskirts of the Empire, thus strengthening the mechanism of the country’s economy with full-blooded transport “arteries”. And although the building of the railway network in the Austrian state had its ups and downs – it was clear to everyone that it would be impossible to go without the construction of such a network.

Since the 1840s, a new stage in the government policy of the Austrian Empire concerning railway issues began, the defining moment of which was the transition to state-owned railway construction, which resulted in the construction of several railways. This was associated with the fact that the construction of a rail track, its operation and maintenance required significant investments, which are not always and not in full could be found. No doubt, that those crown lands (provinces) of the Austrian Empire, which were richer and industrially developed, had a better position because they could always provide their partial or full funds and rely on national and foreign investments. As a rule, the much worse condition was in the industrially underdeveloped, agrarian lands of the Austrian Empire. And Bukovina was among the latter. Such circumstances did not afford any grounds for laying such a mainline over the territory of the region of Bukovina and it could not be of interest to a big national and foreign business. Moreover, if we add here political conflicts in the region, it would be needless to hope for any progress in the transport modernization of Bukovina at all.

Here the statement of I. V. Zhaloba about the beginning of the construction of real railways in Bukovina should be added: "the 60s of the 19th century was one of the most difficult and largely epoch-making milestones in the history of the Habsburg Empire: it marked with the end of the neo-absolutist regime and transition to parliamentarism, defeat in the war with Prussia and “Ausgleich” (“Compromise”) with Hungary. These were only the most important political milestones. As for the economic sphere, it was the period of transition from economic stagnation at the beginning of the decade to an incredibly active economic phase called “Gründerzeit” in the second half of the decade, which lasted up to the crisis of 1873. It was the activity that led to a new leap in the development of the Monarchy’s railways. The prologue to this development was the

construction of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway in the Cisleitanien part of the state, i.e. the implementation of a new, really large railway project after several years of stagnation in the area, caused by the fact that earlier the private capital was rather apathetic to such undertakings”36.

The construction of a railway in Bukovina in the late 1850s – early 1860s was considered in several aspects – it should be a track that would connect the centre of the Austrian Monarchy with the Black Sea ports of Europe and at the same time provide the interests of the Austrian government and big capital. On the other hand, such a mainline would be very beneficial for the development of the national economy in the region of Bukovina. After numerous alterations to the projects of the construction of the mainline that would run through Bukovina, the central place was taken by the project of connecting Lviv with Chernivtsi.

The question about the construction of this mainline was for the first time raised in 1845. Later, this need was also mentioned in different projects and completion reports submitted to the Viennese government and discussed in newspapers and magazines. However, in 1848 the Austrian government decided to build a state railway from Bochnia (a city in nowadays Poland) to Lviv and its two further branches: one to Brody, another to Chernivtsi. However, the political instability during the revolution in the Austrian Monarchy in 1848-1849 prevented the implementation of this project37.

Reports about the construction of a railway in Bukovina are found in several publications of that period. For example, in the Galician press, it was reported that in the spring of 1852, the building of a section of the Yaroslavl-Przemysl-Lviv railway would start and the final destination of the railway the city of Brody was intended to be. In addition, it was also noted that somewhere near Lviv from this mainline the construction of a side branch would soon begin, which would pass through Sambir, Stryi, Zalishchyky and Chernivtsi and would stretch to the border of Moldavia. The “Chas” daily newspaper referred to the reports from Austrian engineers who had already begun the necessary preparatory works.

The next year, in 1853, Carl Ghega, the head of the General State Railways Construction Directorate, submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Trade, where he demonstrated a project for the development of a railway network in

the Austrian Empire. It was a well-considered project and its author emphasized that the presented plan for the development of railways was predetermined by the lag of Austria in quantitative indices of railway construction from major European countries and the United States. C. Gegha substantiated the construction of separate railway lines, set the geographical features of individual regions of the Austrian Monarchy in opposition to their economic and military needs. In this regard, I. V. Zhaloba notes: “According to the plans of Ghega, through the Austrian state from West to East three large lines should be laid, which would intersect vertically with the north-southern lines. The northernmost of the planned east-western lines extended from Bukovina and Galicia through Krakow to Prague and Eger. Thus, taking into account the already existing railways, a kind of giant railway bridge across the Carpathians between Vienna and Chernivtsi is created. In Ghega’s opinion, this railway, which had to foster the economic rise of Galicia and Bukovina, had to be built at state funds”38.

Of course, talks about the construction of a railway in Bukovina found a very enthusiastic reaction in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the region, because it was the institution that defended the interests of Bukovina. Because it was useless to expect any financial support from Bukovina, the Chamber focused the attention of government circles on the national and trade-political needs of such a railway. Moreover, since the early 1850s, the Chamber underlined the nationwide need for construction of the opposite railway from Chernivtsi to Lviv, emphasizing that this was an extremely important addition to the Central European railway network. It was also emphasized on the interests of Austria to establish a direct connection between the East and Vienna.

Only in 1856 the foundation committee of the future share-holding company “Karl-Ludwig Kaiser-Royal Privileged Galician Railway” was formed, which offered four variants of a railway: 1. Przemyśl-Lviv; 2. Lviv-Brody; 3. Przemyśl - along the southern bank of the Dnieper to Chernivtsi and 4. Lviv – southwards to the third line. Lengthy negotiations and coordination with the central authorities and the management of the Northern Railway Company (because this Company had the prior right to purchase already built and develop new lines in Galicia) led to the fact that on April 8, 1858, the final so-called new or additional concession was given. According to the latter, the Karl-Ludwig Railway Company took the commitment to build only the main Przemyśl-Lviv line.

Side branches Lviv-Brody and Lviv-Chernivtsi were considered optional\textsuperscript{39}. On November 4, 1861, the Company built the first railway in Eastern Galicia in the direction Przemyśl-Lviv, which became an integral part of the railway Krakow-Dębica-Przemyśl-Lviv\textsuperscript{40}. The construction of this railway gave the Bukovinian Chamber grounds to substantiate the feasibility of this project and it approved the need for extension of the tracks to Bukovina and acceleration of their construction. This was a very correct and a very necessary decision because among all the crown lands of the Austrian Empire, only Bukovina and Transylvania did not have railway tracks and the absence of railway communication negatively affected the overall economic development of the Empire because it could not provide excessive food products and transportation of livestock from Bukovina and Galicia to Austria. At the same time, the Bukovinian Chamber emphasized the more important state-political and strategic importance of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway mainline.

Here is the statement of I. V. Zhaloba in this regard: “It should be noted that the Austrian government was already well aware of the importance and necessity of extending the Krakow-Lviv line to Chernivtsi with the further prospects for its development. A telling fact in this respect is that during negotiations in 1856-1857 between representatives of the Karl Ludwig-Bahn Railway Company and the Central Defense Commission (which evaluated railway projects from a military-strategic point of view), the Commission insisted on the construction of the Przemyśl-Stryi-Stanislav-Chernivtsi line and only then the Przemyśl-Lviv-Brody line. In the end, in the first turn, it was decided to build the Permyśl-Lviv railway\textsuperscript{41}. I. V. Zhaloba in his articles “Brody or Chernivtsi: choice of the railway direction in the northeast of the Habsburg Monarchy and Bukovina in the 1850s – early 1860s” (2000) and “Discussion of the draft law on the promotion of building the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway in the Austrian parliament and its socio-political reaction (autumn 1863)\textsuperscript{42} very thoroughly describes both projects for the construction of a railway to Bukovina and Brody. These publications give evidence of the importance of building a railway first to Lviv and from Lviv

to Chernivtsi. As far as there were only two possible mainline extensions from Lviv: to Brody or Chernivtsi, all heated discussions were around them.

For example, on February 13, 1862, the “Bukowina” newspaper gives the following response to these plans: “Only one city of Brody alone competes with the entire Duchy of Austria and the united principalities of Moldova and Wallachia... without even one vote from Bukovina or Moldova, expressed in the interests of the Motherland, there was a threaten to lose the involvement in European world trade, or at least place the project of Brody under a reasonable doubt!” 43. Supporting the idea of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway, the newspaper proceeded from the trade interests of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina and a large number of tourists travelling in that direction as well as the state interests of the Monarchy. “At all events, even a blind can see where the eastern way of European world trade leads to Volhynia or Galati”44. Addressing the landowners of Bukovina, the newspaper emphasized their “commendable desire to raise the region spiritually and materially,” hoping that they would continue this tradition.

Continuing the subject of the newspaper, I. V. Zhaloba notes: “As we can see, both the people of Brody and the “Bukowina” newspaper emphasized mainly the general state interests and the interests of the railway company. Such passages, stating the profitability of future railway lines both for railway societies as well as for the region or state were traditional for that time. They should have provoked an interest or strengthen the understanding of the need for such lines in the two main factors of this process – the railway company, which had to build and maintain the line, and the state, which could facilitate this, or undertake the construction and operation as a whole. At the same time, everyone defended his right to be a pioneer in laying his railway, the construction of which had to be started immediately or soon and the rejection of his proposal was considered almost as a fatal nationwide mistake. Such kind of confrontation was also a characteristic phenomenon of that time. It was explained by the fact that there was an extremely widespread belief in the magical power of a railway and almost all the further development of a certain region, province, territory, district, etc. was made dependent on its presence or absence. That is why there was a keen struggle for the right of priority in laying railways in one or another direction» 45.

Of course, each of the lines that competed for the allocation of funds for its construction hoped for its continuation in the future. Thus, the Lviv-Chernivtsi line hoped for the extension of the railway through the territory of the Danube principalities through Iasi to Galati and the Lviv-Brody line through Volhynia deep into the Russian Empire. It would be easier to find funds for quick completion of the construction of one of the lines for the second line Lviv-Brody, because it was less expensive and, in addition, had a shorter length. Neither Eastern Galicia, nor Bukovina, nor Vienna had sufficient funds to build the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway. In addition, the Danube principalities did not have funds to build a railway through the territory of Moldova. Therefore, the main hopes were resting on attracting foreign capital, first of all British. However, because of the political instability in the Danube principalities, the foreign capital was cautious about that region and was reluctant to invest in precarious businesses. This was the reason why the construction of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway was constantly delayed. Moreover, among the mentioned reasons the situation in Bukovina itself should be added: except for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, other societies of the region and representative offices did not represent a proper initiative. On this occasion there is a correct statement in the Lviv “Lemberger Zeitung” newspaper of September 9, 1862: “although a Bukovinian nobleman supports the construction of railways and their laying in a neighbour country, he is unwilling to give (for railway construction) lands and invest in shares; a burgher and a peasant do not have any wealth and therefore it is idle to expect their readiness for donations.”

Finally, the choice fell on the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway. The circumstance that prevailed, in the end, was the Polish uprising in the early 1860s in the Russian Empire. For this reason, the Russian government did not carry out railway construction in the region and the extension of the Lviv-Brody railway was postponed indefinitely. To this circumstance, the following considerations should be added, which were undoubtedly taken into account by the Austrian Government. The change in the trade and transport situation at the beginning of the second half of the 19th century led gradually to a shift in the direction of trade, in particular through Brody. As far as the city, as noted, was not industrially developed, it did not represent any interest to the government and big capital. On the contrary, laying the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway over the territory of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina made it possible to attract a much larger productive part of the region to the transport sphere of the railway, even on the

46 Isidor Prodan. Bukovinskie Ocherki (Har’kov: Mirnyj Trud, 1914), 34 [in Russian].
Austrian territory. Also, it was possible to count on a much larger cargo volume than in the Lviv-Brody line. In addition to traditional agricultural and forestry products, the development of metallurgy in Southern Bukovina was also taken into account, because the reports on industrial metal deposits there were quite optimistic at that time. In addition, the comparison of the endpoints of the branches Brody or Chernivtsi was not in favour of the first one. Chernivtsi, the capital of the Duchy, had all the signs of growth, which at the same time could not be said about Brody.

From the point of view of strategic and state-political interests of the government, the Lviv-Chernivtsi line was also more profitable, as it provided an outlet to two borders at once: the Russian and the Moldavian. In addition, the Danube principalities were considered as the most attractive area for the economic expansion of Austria, in fact, the only region at that time, where it could compete successfully with other European countries48.

The main motivation to accelerate the railway construction in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina consisted in the fact that Austrian railways in the centre of the Monarchy could only become profitable when they could connect the railways with Galicia and Bukovina and “get closer to the East” (to Russia and Romania). In this process, the Bukovinian Chamber of Commerce and Crafts was especially active after the first railway Przemyśl-Lviv line was opened in Eastern Galicia on November 4, 1861. As is known, it extended the Krakow-Debica mainline and received the name of the “Krakow-Debica-Przemysl-Lviv” line. This mainline was built by the joint-stock railway company “Karl Ludwig Kaiser-Royal Privileged Galician Railway”49.

Therefore, for many years, the Austrian government focused its attention on the painful problem of laying the necessary railway between the centre of the Austrian Empire and Chernivtsi. This was predetermined by the need in linking economically and politically disparate parts of the Austrian Empire. This is what Baron Tornau, the Russian military attache in Vienna, said on this issue: “Being aware of a great danger posed by the moral unity of the constituent parts of the Empire, the Austrian government spared neither labour nor costs to establish a material connection between them which could balance the disadvantages of the ethnographic position of the state. Believing that railways are one of the most effective means, he used a large part of public resources to build

them, and missing funds were supplemented by foreign capitalists⁵⁰. There is no need to underscore, that the construction of railways in Bukovina helped Austrian entrepreneurs to significantly increase the delivery of their products to Bukovina markets. At the same time, the central Austrian enterprises were provided with the cheap raw materials they needed.

The construction of railways in Bukovina was also in the military and political interests of the Austrian Monarchy in the south-eastern region of Europe because by laying the railways, the Austrian government provided itself with a favourable strategic position on a possible battle-ground. It is clear that thanks to rail transport, the Austrian General Staff could at any time quickly and in a sufficient number to concentrate its troops on the borders with the Russian Empire and Romania. And during the war, the railways, in general, provided great opportunities for troop manoeuvres, their provision, etc. At the same time, due to the railways, the Austrian Empire planned, and thus carried out political and economic enslavement of the peoples living here in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina. Practically, thanks to the railways, as well as the waterways and in particular the Danube, Austrian industrial goods were sent to south-eastern Europe, as well as political pressure from the Austrian government was imposed⁵¹.

After the first railway between Lviv and Chernivtsi had been built, the government of the Austrian Monarchy continued to show its interest in the development of railway transport in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina. In the centre of the Austrian Empire, it was understood that the absence of rail connections with Bukovina and Transylvania caused significant damage to the overall economic development of the Empire – any possibility to deliver products from the so-called “crown lands” was limited. The local business societies in Galicia and Bukovina, who constantly apply for the further extension of the railway lines further from Chernivtsi, also did not sit on their hands.

The rapid pace of the transport revolution in the advanced capitalist countries demonstrated an enormous economic, political and military-strategic importance of railways to the world, which forced the Austrian government to deal even more with railway issues in the Habsburg Empire. That is why the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iasi railway would best meet the abovementioned conditions as an outlet to the Black Sea.

As is known, the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway was built by the Joint Stock Company “Kaiser-Royal Privileged Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway”. Therefore, even dur-


ing the construction of the Lviv-Chernivtsi mainline, the Company planned the possibility of extending this mainline to the borders of Bukovina with an outlet to the Black Sea. This possibility was especially thoroughly studied by the leaders of the Company – Victor Ofenheim, Leon Sapieha and the Englishman Thomas Brassey. They saw two possible extensions of the railway from Chernivtsi – through Novoselytsia to Bessarabia to Odesa and through Southern Bukovina (the territory of present Moldova) to Galati, Romania. I.V. Zhaloba describes this process as follows: “Thus, even before a shovel touched the ground on the Lviv-Chernivtsi line, it was clear to everyone that this railway was considered only as an intermediate stage in a “big leap” to the warm waters of the Black Sea. As the case with the extension of the railway through Novoselytsia to Odessa was not as successful as desired, it was decided to stop in the direction of Moldova. Indeed, from the press, it became known about the intention of the consortium headed by Sapieha to build a railway from Sniatyn to Bucharest. In the case of this project fulfilment, the section from Sniatyn to Chernivtsi turned out to be only a side dead-end line, Chernivtsi remained beyond of great trade and transport traffic, and the further extension of the railway from the regional capital to the south of the region to Suceava was postponed indefinitely. It is quite natural that this information caused a great concern in Bukovina, and on October 22, 1866, V. Alt, the President of the Bukovina Chamber of Commerce and Industry convened its members for a special meeting. It ended in the appeal on behalf of the Chamber to the Ministry of Trade, in which demand was put on giving a concession to the mentioned consortium only if Chernivtsi would be the starting point of the railway” 52.

Choosing one of the directions that would extend the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway was an interesting and at the same time developmental experience. Already at the first meeting on May 30, 1865, the shareholders of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway considered the issues on advantages and disadvantages of each of the future directions of the extension of the main railway line in Bukovina. Here, the preference was given to the Odessa direction, although the direction to Galati also offered prospects of getting “a very favourable profit” 53. The fact is that the first direction through Novoselytsia to Chisinau and Odessa was more acceptable both in terms of political and economic advantages for Austria, as well as in terms of purely technical characteristics of railway construction: the line would be laid mainly on the plain surface. In such a way, the Austrian Empire

would get a direct and short outlet to the ports of Odessa, and Austrian entrepreneurs could significantly expand sales of their products not only in Southeast Europe but also reach Asia. As a result, more Austrian ships would sail at the Black Sea, and hence more foreign trading houses would appear in Odesa.

Along with gaining such advantages, the Austrian Monarchy turned into a serious competitor for Russia, as far as using a railway, Austrians would be able to quickly and suddenly concentrate their troops on the border with Russia and even capture the port of Odesa. Moreover, as far as the railway network in that southern part of the Russian Empire was developed poorly, a significant part of Russian troops would remain on the left bank of the Dniester. Therefore, about half a year later, on September 6, 1864, at a special meeting of the Council of the Company, the issue of extending the Lviv-Chernivtsi mainline to the Black Sea was very urgently considered again. Such an urgent meeting was predetermined by the fact that the Russian government was approached with a proposal to build a railway from Odessa to the Austrian border by the French Railway Association. At the same time, the Russian government itself began to build a railway from Odessa to Chisinau. Therefore, the Austrian Company resumed active negotiations with the Russian government to obtain concessions for the construction of a railway from Odessa to Chisinau and further to the Austrian border. About a month later, in October 1864, the claims of the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway Company were even supported by the Novorossiysk and Bessarabian Governor-General P.E. Kotzebue, and a month later the Company’s proposals were considered by the Central Administration of Public Buildings of the Russian Empire. The project of building a new railway, prepared by the director of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway, pointed out the importance of opening sales of Bessarabian bread for Russia through the port of Odesa and directing the Austrian transit traffic through the Russian provinces and Odesa to the Black Sea. However, the draft agreement contained several such requirements, which previously were not expressed to Russia by any foreign company.

The Russian government did not make a final decision immediately but decided to conduct a series of exploration works. Austrian engineers refused to cooperate with Russian colleagues. The same plans presented by them were mostly false. This situation was best described by the Russian engineer O. O. Golovachev: “Ofenheim’s proposal fully characterizes the view of foreign swin-
dlers on our business world. People like them probably thought that we, due to the need for railways, would not be able to appreciate the benefits that they were able to provide to the uncivilized people from the North. They go so far in their impertinence that does not even find it necessary to determine the length of the railway more precisely or consider it possible to increase it by as much as a quarter, so they also do not consider it necessary to specify the amount of capital, hoping that we can swallow this bait as well, and they will use those funds to cover their expenses on the construction of a railway from Lviv to our border. But such an impertinence of those swindlers does not stop even on that. They demand a right for ownership on the railway for 90 years from the beginning of traffic opening, construction of a railway with a track gauge as on the Austrian railways, free allocation of land near the port of Odesa for building warehouses and shops; exemption from all dues and taxes in that area and, finally, special jurisdiction to resolve misunderstandings between the Company and the government, i.e. the arbitral tribunal in one of the foreign embassies. It is quite strange that people allow themselves to make such proposals relying on some success, but even more surprising that these proposals are seriously discussed and twice submitted to the Committee of Russian Railways, although in a modified form”57.

According to archival documents, Ofenheim’s proposals were indeed considered in 1865-1866 at five meetings of the Railway Committee and two meetings of the Council of Ministers. In addition to the arguments provided by O.O. Golovachev, there were also those that we presented earlier. Indeed, in the case of connecting the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway with Odesa through Novoselytsia and Chisinau, Austria would gain several advantages in the region, and Russia would get a dangerous competitor. Therefore, taking into account the set of facts and based primarily on their interests, on October 28, 1866, the Russian government finally rejected that proposal and preferred to build the Kyiv-Balta railway with a branch to Lviv58.

Thus, because of their own insolent and inconsiderate actions, the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway Company failed in tsarist Russia. However, cunning Ofenheim had a backup plan, which is building a line to Suceava, Romania. Already

57 Aleksej Golovachev. Istoriya Zheleznodorozhnogo Dela v Rosii (Sankt-Peterburg, 1881), 80 [in Russian].

on May 15, 1867, thanks to Ofenheim, who took an advantage of an unstable political situation in the Austrian Empire (because Kaiser suspended the activity of the parliament), the Company obtained the desired concession (from Latin – permission, agreement) from the government to build a section of the Chernivtsi-Suceava railway. The Austrian state guaranteed the Company a net profit for 700,000 florins in silver on this mainline and an exemption from taxable income for 9 years from the moment of the railway opening. Englishman T. Brassey was responsible for the construction of this section. During the construction of the Lviv-Chevronivtsi mainline, the Englishman undertook a commitment to contribute half of the capital needed for the construction and did that by reacquisition of senior bonds.

Without going into all twists and turns of the preparatory period, which were analyzed in detail by I.V. Zhaloba in his article “On the way to the Black Sea: from the history of the construction of the railway Lviv-Chernivtsi to Suceava and Iasi”59, we should note that the construction of the Chernivtsi-Suceava section, started in the autumn of 1867, had rapid progress. October 28, 1869, 5.58 PM. From Suceava, a train to Chernivtsi departed, which started the movement on this section of 89.9 km60. The train passed one station after another: Chițcani, Gatga, Mileseuc, Ishtensegits, Hadikfalva, Cherepkivtsi, Hlyboka, Kuchurmare (now Velykyi Kuchuriv), Volksgarten (now Pivdenna station) and reached the Chernivtsi railway station61.

We have already noted that the extension of the railway from the Austrian border to one of the Black Sea ports, in particular to Galati was in the interests of the government of the Austrian Monarchy, as well as in the interests of the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway Company. The Director-General of the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway V. Ofenheim cherished that idea since the early 1860s. Here he also had good luck – in June 1868 he managed to obtain a concession for the construction of the Suceava-Iași railway of 179.5 km length (initially Suceava-Chițcani-Roman of 102.9 km length and Parcani-Iași of 76.6 km), and hence, the side Verești-Botoșani branch (44.5 km). The total length reached 223 km. I. V. Zhaloba describes this process as follows: “Although the Company did not get a direct outlet to Galati, the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway was no longer threat-

60 Czernowitzer Zeitung (14.08.1869): 4.
61 Hauptbericht und Statistik über das Herzogtum Bukowina fur die Periode vom Jahre 1862-1871 (Lemberg, 1872): 342.
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...ened by the fate of a dead-end railway. The terms of the concession were very favourable. The Romanian government guaranteed the concessionaires the right of expropriation, financial assistance during the construction for 40,000 francs per kilometre, a ten-year exemption from taxes and import duties and an annual profit of 37,432,550 francs (which was equal to 14,973,000 florins in silver). On July 13, 1868, another construction contract was concluded with Thomas Brassey, similar to that concluded for the construction of the Suceava Railway, and in the summer of the same year, the construction of Romanian lines immediately began. The fifth special meeting of shareholders, held on October 15, 1868, unanimously supported the acceptance of concessions given by the Romanian government and for renaming of the Privileged Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway Company to the Privileged Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași Railway Company with the corresponding changes in the statute. The company of T. Brassey carried out a rapid construction and reached Roman at the mark of 102.9 km on the territory of modern Moldova within a month. On June 1, 1870, the Parcani-Iași section (76.6 km) was completed. However, the side Verești-Botoșani line (44.5 km) was commissioned only on November 1, 1871. Thus, the total length of the main railways’ extension crossing the territories of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Romania reached 579.6 km.

The joint-stock company “Kaiser-Royal Privileged Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași Railways” lost the right to build a railway up to Galati and, accordingly, an outlet to the Black Sea. For lack of funds, it failed to implement the concession of 1872. As a result, the Prussian financier Henry Strousberg, taking advantage of the new parliamentary elections in Romania and the change in the Romanian government, took over the joint-stock company “Romanian Railways” founded by himself and the right to build the Roman Galati railway and its extension to Brăila-Buzău-Vârcioroava.

“Thus, the event, to which both the government circles of Vienna and the management of the Lviv-Chernivtsi railway were striving for, had happened: for the first time, the ports of the Baltic and North Seas were put into direct communication with the Black Sea. This connection passed through the Austrian

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64 Ivan Feshchenko-Chopovskij, Promyslennost’ i Prirodnye Bagatstva Galicii (Kiev: Tip. A. M. Ponomareva, I. I. Vrublevskogo, 1915), 22 [in Russian].

65 Stal’nym Magistralyam Moldavii 100 let (Kishinev: Kartya. Moldavenyaske, 1971): 229 [in Russian].
territory and was possible due to the Austrian Railway, which, moreover, had its lines on the territory of Romania. «The connection of the Austrian and Romanian railways occurred at a point desired by the Austrians, and the conditions under which the Romanian government granted a concession to the Austrian and English applicants were extremely favourable” concluded I. V. Zhaloba.66

Undoubtedly, the construction of the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași railway was a remarkable event and had an important economic, political and strategic importance. The Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași railway became an important link in the Eastern European network of railways, and it was used to provide a constant link between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. Thanks to the signing of an agreement with the Romanian government on the connection of the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași railway with the Romanian railway network, the Company gained an outlet to Galati. At the same time, this railway became a kind of channel, which helped the Viennese government to monitor everything that had been done in Galicia and Bukovina and on the outskirts of the Habsburg Monarchy.

**Conclusions**

The rapid pace of the transport revolution in the advanced countries, which demonstrated a gigantic economic, political and military-strategic importance of the railways to the world, forced the government of the Habsburg Monarchy to deal with the railway issue very seriously. The construction of railways in Bukovina was also in the political and socio-economic interests of Austria in the south-eastern region of Europe because by laying the railways, the imperial government provided itself with a favourable strategic position in the region. During the construction of the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iași main railway line, railway communications came to the first place in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in terms of material and technical potential and defense and economic importance time. Three fundamental factors had a decisive influence on the operation of this railway: 1) integration of the ways of communication in Bukovina with the general transport network of Austria-Hungary; 2) miscalculations of Austrian railway companies regarding the terms of construction; 3) struggle of two opponents: private railway companies and the state. However, a circumspect policy of the Austrian government regarding the material and technical support of the road and the tariff issue provided fulfilment of most of the tasks set before it through the communication network of the Empire.

It was shown that private railways, as important transport arteries of Bukovina, had nationwide importance and played a significant role in the transport system of Austria-Hungary. They served the leading economic regions of Bukovina, acting in each of them as an integral part of the production. In other words, they were used to provide local, inter-industry and regional connections.

Rezumat

Acest studiu își propune să revizuiască condițiile socio-politice și economice ale creării și începutului funcționării principalelor căi ferate din Bucovina. Analiza literaturii științifice și a memoriilor, revizuirea surselor arhivistice a permis stabilirea faptului că problema formării și începutul rețelei de căi ferate din Bucovina din perioada austro-ungară nu a făcut obiectul unei investigații sistematice. Astfel autorii au arătat că ideea construirii căilor ferate în Bucovina era, de asemenea, în interesele politice și socio-economice ale Austriei în această parte a Europei, deoarece prin construcția căilor ferate, guvernul imperial s-a asigurat cu o poziție strategică favorabilă în regiune. Pe baza rezultatelor studiului, s-a stabilit că odată cu construirea căii ferate Lviv-Cernăuți-Iași, comunicațiile feroviare au ajuns pe primul loc în Imperiul Austro-Ungar în ceea ce privește potențialul material, tehnic, de apărare și economic.

Cuvinte cheie: căile ferate ale Bucoviniei, Imperiul Austro-Ungar, rețele de transport, A. Ficker, G. Biedermann.

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